The open source movement

 

Richard Hunter of Gartner relieves that the open source movement is a prime example of a net work army.  Open source means that (1) the complete source code must be distributed with any and all distributions, and (2) that anyone can modify and redistribute the code to anyone to use.  A prime example of open source software is Linux, the operating system whose kernel was written by Linus Torvalds.  The opposite of  open source is proprietary software, which is sold only in its compiled state (undecipherable by humans) and is not allowed to be changed except by the developer.

 

Open source is mainly about how software is developed, enhanced, and managed.  The open source movement is a community with a shared culture, where people earn their membership by the quality of the code they produce.  Members are volunteers; no one is paid.  They do it for fun (they love to code), to hang around with other like-minded developers (“fiery brains,” says Hunter), and to be part of  a worthy cause. Torvalds´ goal in developing Linux was to “write software that does not suck.”  He reasoned that the best way to do that would be to let interested software developers chip in and improve any part that attracted them.  Thus, it is a culture of mavericks who want lots of personal autonomy, guided by minimal conformance.

 

The movement has a massive flat structure with 4 “influencers” (including Torvalds), 6 to 8 distributors who package versions, some 200 project leaders who manage active projects, and some 750,000 volunteer developers (as of late 2001).

 

The number is probably higher now.  The developers follow the influencers because they have the same values.  This flat structure is possible, says Hunter, because the Internet allows the influencers to communicate directly with the developers, and vice versa.  Hence, the influencers know what the volunteers think, which can make it both harder for them to lead as well as to mislead.  In addition, all communications are open via bulletin boards, e-mail lists, and other Internet-based channels that anyone can join.

 

Hunter notes that when he and his Gartner colleagues critiqued the viability of open source software in 1999, they believed it would capture 15 percent of the server operating system market.  “Wew did not realize this was a disruptive technology that could change the software world,” he notes.  Less than 2 years later, after “getting it,” they significantly increased their assessment to predicting that open source would be used in 80 percent of businesses by year-end 2003.  Hunter now believes it is not wise to underestimate the claims of network armies, as Microsoft apparently did.  The worst mistake a business can make is to become the nemesis of a network army, and that is what Microsoft did in 1998.  Until that time, the open source movement´s only goal was to write useful software.  However, in August 1998, Microsoft saw the open source movement as a threat and wrote an internal paper that proposed ways to eliminate it.  That study of course fell into the hands of an open source member, states Hunter, because this is a world without secrets.  The open source movement always distrusted Microsoft, and that trust hardened into rage once the study was published on the Web under the moniker, The Halloween Papers.

 

Microsoft´s past tactics for addressing competitors are not appropriate for dealing with a network army, writes Hunter.  There are no open source revenues, so Microsoft cannot undercut prices (as it did in bundling its browser into Windows and destroying Netscape).  There  is no one to negotiate with, so the movement cannot be bought and then taken apart (as many past competitors have been).

 

All “negotiations” with a network army must be in  public, notes Hunter, and consist of actions, not words, which is what Microsoft is now doing.  Its executives are arguing against the movement in public forums, hoping to dissuade executives from using open source software.  But when it first denied, and then acknowledged, that it was using such software itself to support Hotmail and other services due to the superiority of the open  source software, Microsoft lost credibility.  Open  source  members only believe actions.  They want people to do the right thing because they see their cause as a moral one.

 

Hunter believes Microsoft thought it was up against a rival business and tried to use the tactics it used successfully against other businesses.  However, a network army is more like a religion than a business, and you do not fight a religious movement by telling its members that they are worshippers of an evil, false god.  Better to find some way to work with them on projects of mutual interest as a  means of establishing personal trust.  However, Microsoft has not wanted to coexist with anyone, so it has taken a different route.  It is a dangerous route, Hunter believes.  Businesses that face a  network army cannot make it go away without addressing the underlying issues.  Treating a network army like a business is bound to backfire.